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Abstract
The year 1968 is universally considered a watershed in his-
tory, as the world was experiencing an accelerated growth
of anti-establishment protests that would have long-lasting
impacts on the cultural, social, and political spheres of
human life. On September 26, amid social and political
unrest across the globe, 62 physicists gathered in Geneva
to found the European Physical Society. Among these were
the official representatives of the national physical societies
of 18 countries in both Eastern and Western Europe, who
signed the constitution in spite of the political divides of the
Cold War. According to the main proponent of the society,
Italian physicist Gilberto Bernardini, the success of the ini-
tiative was the realization of a dream: the institutional for-
mation of a single community of European physicists, a
representation of a culturally unified Europe that he
described as a “single highly civilized nation.” The analysis
of as yet unexplored archival materials of Bernardini and
other protagonists in the establishment of the society has
enabled an investigation of the historical development of
science diplomacy in two interconnected ways: first, by elu-
cidating how the actors involved, especially those in West-
ern Europe, interpreted their role as diplomats amid
particularly turbulent reconfigurations of international polit-
ical relations; second, by interpreting the attempt to
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institutionalize transnational scientific networks with the
establishment of a non-governmental organization as a tool
to influence world political affairs. It will first be shown that
the political ideal of a culturally unified Europe was deeply
intertwined with the socio-professional interests of a spe-
cific community, mostly involved with CERN. I will argue
that, in the process of establishing the society, the invasion
of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact armed forces led many
of the Western physicists involved in this process to
reframe the role of the European Physical Society as a tool
to diffuse liberal-democratic values and to support political
dissidents in Eastern Europe.
K E YWORD S
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1 | INTRODUCTION
On September 26, 1968, 62 physicists, including the official representatives of the national physics societies of 18
countries in both Eastern and Western Europe, gathered in Geneva to found the European Physical Society (EPS). At
the time of its foundation, the EPS was one of the very few specifically European international scientific organiza-
tions to transcend the Cold War political divide. Even more remarkably, the society, with its broad East–West Euro-
pean membership, was founded only 1 month after five member countries of the Warsaw Pact had invaded
Czechoslovakia to stop the Prague Spring and the liberal reforms enacted by Alexander Dubcˇek.1
The particularity and timing of the foundation of the EPS makes this process a particularly suitable case for
investigating the historical development of what has been recently termed “European science diplomacy” and its
connection with the “European style of research” in two interconnected ways: first, by elucidating how the involved
physicists, especially those in Western Europe, interpreted their role as diplomats amid particularly turbulent
reconfigurations of international political relations; and second, by interpreting the attempt to institutionalize trans-
national scientific networks with the establishment of a non-governmental organization as a tool to influence world
political affairs.2 In doing so, the paper takes the perspective promoted by transnational approaches to the history of
science, which have increasingly highlighted transnational networks as crucial analytical units in uncovering the role
of non-state actors in international endeavors at the intersection between science and politics.3
1The countries involved in the invasion of Czechoslovakia were Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR. Although they were ready to
support the operation, East German troops were eventually prevented from crossing the Czechoslovak national border on Soviet orders because it was
feared that the memory of the German occupation during World War II would have increased Czechoslovak resistance: Stolarik (2010, pp. 136–164), see
also Gschwend (2008). Although East Germany's troops did not actually enter Czechoslovak territory, from the perspective of Western public opinion, the
country was involved in the invasion.
2Quotations from Müller & Bona (2018); Stein (2002, p. 468). See also Moedas (2016).
3For the role of international nongovernmental organizations in world affairs, see Iriye (2002). For the importance of transnational networks in the history
of science diplomacy, see Turchetti, Herran, & Boudia (2012).
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In his inaugural speech, the first EPS president, Italian cosmic-ray and nuclear physicist Gilberto Bernardini,
made it clear that the society was created to fulfill both a scientific and a political function. Among the most
important scientific purposes of the society, Bernardini emphasized the coordination of physics journals, sum-
mer schools, and conferences, as well as support for teaching activities and the circulation of students. But for
Bernardini, the EPS would also play a subtler and even more important role at a completely different level. The
EPS was deemed a “utopian” enterprise of people who held an implicit belief in Europe and saw the society as
a contribution to the realization of “European cultural unity.” And a culturally unified Europe, Bernardini
believed, could prove to be a guiding light of humanity, where “[s]cience could take the role of a new
humanism.”4
Bernardini presented an elitist, scientistic, and of course, Eurocentric vision in which the conjunction of
Europe and science was fated to play a fundamental role in the future structure of human society. In other public
speeches, he presented the EPS as a contribution to a more ambitious political project: the political integration of
all Europe doomed to become “a single highly civilized nation.”5 Whatever we may think about the naivety, Euro-
centrism, and scientism of the views expounded by Bernardini during such a strained historical period, they signal
that some of the protagonists involved in the venture saw the foundation of the society as a diplomatic endeavor
aimed at supporting the process of European political integration by transcending national borders, both political
and ideological.
In this paper, I take this diplomatic ambition seriously. By drawing on a large amount of as yet unexplored
archival materials stored in the personal collections of key figures involved in the establishment of the society, I
analyze how the discussions about the functions and structure of the society were framed in relation to the politi-
cal context. Letters, committee reports, and transcripts of committee meetings reveal the views and opinions of
those involved, which can then be compared with the public image of the society they portrayed in their speeches.
Even if private views occasionally emerge, the material analyzed above all concerns the shared discourse, within
the arena of the meetings and conversations, of a special group of physicists—a group formed by elite individuals
at the center of European physics, both at national and international levels. The documents and the approach
employed have led me to use a double conception of politics. The first, narrow conception is limited to how the
actors tried to position themselves and the society against the background of what they saw as macro-political
processes in the changing international relations within Europe. The second conception concerns the relation
of the society's functions to national governments' interests in the context of the international governance of
science.
By giving relevance to the scientists' own perspectives rather than to state or diplomatic actors, I try to
elucidate how the socio-professional interests of a specific scientific community based in Western Europe
interacted with larger political and cultural forces in establishing the idea of physics as a diplomatic tool in the
construction of Europe and how this idea became so strong as to lead to the establishment of a brand new
society.6 I then argue that, in the process of its establishment, the diplomatic function of the society was rec-
onfigured as a tool to diffuse liberal-democratic values in reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,
especially by becoming a transnational network that supported a dissident physicist in Czechoslovakia suffer-
ing political discrimination.
4“Official Inauguration” (1968, p. 7).
5“European Physical Society” (1968, p. 35).
6The idea of physics as a diplomatic tool for improving international relations, with special reference to the European context, is certainly not new. In the
19th century, various international scientific ventures were already being promoted (also) by physicists who combined internationalist perspectives with a
Eurocentric vision: Crawford, Shinn, & Sörlin (1993). This was especially true of the activities of the International Bureau of Weights and Measures,
established near Paris in 1875. However, many of the projects between the late 19th and the early 20th centuries were strongly shaped by a form of
scientific internationalism that was close to what Geert Somsen coined “Olympic internationalism,” where the international arena served as the necessary
environment in which to compete for national scientific prestige: Somsen (2008); see also Forman (1973). The same held true for the International Meter
Commission and the Bureau of Weights and Measures: Daston (2019). This is very different from the case I discuss here. I will show that in the views of
many protagonists, national competition between European physicists was one of the major problems this society was designed to solve.
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2 | THE POLITICAL CONTEXT: THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS
AND THE COLD WAR
Bernardini first made the proposal to create a European forum for physicists at a meeting of the Italian Physical Soci-
ety in Bologna in November 1965. A series of steps undertaken subsequently saw the increasing participation of
European physicists, including official representatives of European national physical societies. This process ended
with the successful foundation of the EPS in Geneva 3 years later.7 The main proponents came to perceive their
actions as being pioneering, and clearly framed them as such. The society was one of the first to be explicitly aimed
at building connections throughout the entire European continent. There were many international organizations
whose purpose was to improve scientific cooperation across borders, in Europe and elsewhere, but none of them
could provide a model for a European scientific society that transcended the Cold War divide. Both the organization
and legal structure of the society had to be decided through internal discussions within the physics community itself.
This was even more necessary because the EPS was designed as a private organization rather than one based on a
contract between national governments, as is the case for intergovernmental organizations such as CERN or
UNESCO.8 Because of how original the initiative was at the time, it is reductive to interpret the move toward the
foundation of the society as a simple consequence of broader historical forces pointing to greater European
integration.
Nonetheless, it is necessary to understand how the proposal to establish a European society of physicists was
embedded within the interconnected developments of two major broader economic and political processes: Euro-
pean integration and the Cold War. There were many elements of these broader contexts that certainly provided
conditions without which the society would hardly have been proposed. Among them, the first steps toward the
foundation of the EPS were certainly favored by the successful implementation of economic integration between
the Inner Six of the European Economic Community, by the period of slight détente in Europe in the 1960s, and,
more subtly, by the impact in the mid-1960s public discourse of Charles de Gaulle's geopolitical vision of an inter-
governmental Western Europe embedded in a larger pan-European system. This system would encompass “the
Atlantic to the Urals,” as opposed to the US-dominated Atlantic system embodied by the NATO alliance.9
Established in 1957, the European Economic Community enjoyed considerable success from the late 1950s to
the early 1960s. In 1962, various surveys showed that Western European elites were strongly in favor of greater
European integration and considered the nation-state to be an “obsolete” political form.10 This view was supported
by widespread approaches in the political sciences, such as Ernst Haas's influential theory of neofunctionalism, which
depicted an increasingly politically integrated Europe as an inevitable and automatic consequence of the economic
cooperation in specific sectors.11
In November 1965, however, when Bernardini proposed the creation of a common European forum, the situa-
tion was less promising: De Gaulle's opposition to the UK's request to join the European Economic Community in
1963 and the “empty chair” political crisis in July 1965 shook some of the most optimistic views about future politi-
cal integration in Western Europe.12 The Economic Community was still limited to only seven countries.13 Whatever
hope there was for greater political integration in the future, it concerned a very limited part of Europe, which was
not the broad Europe Bernardini and the other physicists envisaged as the geographical reach of the future European
physics forum.
7“From Bologna to Geneva” (1968); Bernardini (1972); Bevilacqua, Giannetto, & Tagliaferri (1993); Kubbinga (2008).
8Pierre Lalive, professor of law at the Institut des Hautes Études Internationales in Switzerland, stated “[A]t the present time it is just impossible to create
an international society in a legal sense. It simply doesn't exist.” “Outline of Legal Problems Concerning the European Physical Society” [Transcript] (1968,
Jan. 30), Folder Meeting of the Steering Committee in Geneva 30/01/1968, EPS, Fondo Archivistico Gilberto Bernardini, Centro Archivistico della Scuola
Normale Superiore, Pisa, Italy (hereafter, AGB/EPS).
9De Ménil (1977); Ludlow (2007); Soutou (2007).
10Lerner (1962); Riffault (1962); von Stackelberg (1962).
11Haas (1958).
12Loth (2015).
13Greece had joined the six inner countries in 1961, but its membership would be suspended in 1967 as a consequence of the military coup d'état.
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A counter-balance to the apparent setback of Western European integration was the period of détente in
Europe, forcefully promoted by De Gaulle. In the mid-1960s, the polarity imposed by the rivalry of the two super-
powers was contrasted by the foreign policies of some Western European countries. In the same period, attempts by
Soviet Bloc countries to pursue policies of international relations that were more independent of Soviet leadership
were also becoming apparent in Western Europe. As Jussi Hanhimäki has pointed out, the détente in Europe starting
in 1962 was “first, and foremost, a European project.”14 Whatever De Gaulle's more subtle and nationalistic political
strategies were, his rhetoric in favor of a united West–East Europe became particularly influential among the
public.15
These broader political processes provided the historical conditions for the creation of the EPS. Greater emanci-
pation from the United States on the part of continental Western European countries, internal reforms in certain
Eastern European countries, an increasing optimism about the feasibility of supranational integration processes,
political efforts to create bridges to overcome the Iron Curtain in Europe, all were indispensable in envisioning and
pursuing the institutionalization of a pan-European physics community. However, it was the scientific status of phys-
ics in Western Europe, and more specifically at CERN, that initially provided the strongest motivation for creating a
common society.
3 | CERN AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN CULTURAL UNITY
THROUGH PHYSICS
According to a narrative widespread among physicists, CERN played a fundamental role in the foundation of the EPS
for two reasons. Firstly, it was the model of successful European scientific cooperation, and this, moreover, was not
limited to Western Europe. (Based on the intergovernmental cooperation of Western and Central European coun-
tries, by the mid-1960s CERN had also become the site of regular collaborations with scientists working in Soviet
Bloc countries.) Secondly, CERN provided the existing infrastructure for the EPS.16 There is no doubt that CERN
played this twofold role. Its instrumental position in the establishment of the EPS appears even more evident when
one recognizes that the core group of actors behind the initial proposal to found a European physical society was
composed of nuclear and particle physicists who were, or had been, involved in research at CERN. It is not an over-
statement, then, to claim that CERN was the cradle of the society in many different ways: as a model, as an infra-
structure, and as the venue for the formation of a transnational network of individuals.17
CERN, however, did not only play a positive role as the arena where the idea took shape, spread, and was even-
tually realized. More in-depth historical scrutiny of how a European physical society became a priority for Bernardini
and other leading physicists at CERN shows that the role of the laboratory was much more complex. By 1965, the
year of the Bologna conference, CERN was perceived only partially as a scientific success. In 1960, there had been
much anticipation of the first planned experiment to be performed with the 24 GeV Protosynchroton (PS), which for
a few months enjoyed the status of the most powerful accelerator in the world. Priority was given to an experiment
designed to test whether there was more than one type of neutrino. Proposed by Bernardini himself, this experiment
was seen as having a potentially Nobel-Prize worthy outcome. The preparation for the experiment, however, made
evident the many problems European physicists faced in learning how to do big physics.18 Eventually, a similar exper-
iment was successfully performed by a U.S. team at the newly established Alternating Gradient Synchrotron at the
Brookhaven National Laboratories (BNL). This was a serious setback for European physicists and for the aging
14Hanhmäki (2010, p. 198). Emphasis in the original.
15See, for example, the Google Ngram Viewer diagram of the expression “Atlantic to the Urals” between 1920 and 1980 in books digitized by Google. In
spite of the limitations to the reliability of this sort of analysis, the spread of the vision publicly expounded by De Gaulle in the late 1950s is evident. See
also Anceau (2016).
16“1968 The Foundation of EPS” (2018); Voss (2018).
17For CERN as a model of European technoscientific cooperation, see Kohlrausch & Trischler (2014, pp. 208–216).
18Hermann, Krige, Mersits, & Pestre (1990).
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Bernardini himself, as it was his last opportunity to make a historical discovery.19 In the next few years, very precise
measurements were performed at CERN, but the main breakthroughs in experimental particle physics were all made
at the BNL.20 Clearly, by the mid-1960s, European high-energy physicists had reasons to believe that there was a
large gap between the scientific and organizational practices of the U.S. research environment and their own, which
could not be solved simply by constructing large accelerators.21
At exactly the same time, scientists and policymakers at CERN were debating the next generation of accelera-
tors to be built. This discussion also came to involve the future of the national research programs of CERN member-
states. Within this context, a coordinated action was planned: the European high-energy pyramid. The pyramid was
conceived as an international infrastructure of small- and medium-size accelerators in CERN member-states at the
base of the pyramid, while the apex consisted of the most powerful accelerators at CERN. The pyramid scheme gave
the particle physicists of CERN member-states a powerful argument to use with their own governments in promot-
ing the construction of new accelerators. Two of the physicists most involved in promoting the pyramid scheme
were Bernardini and the director of the Max Planck Institute for Nuclear Physics, Wolfgang Gentner. The latter, in
particular, was campaigning in his home country and within the Max Planck Society for nuclear and high-energy
physics to be expanded with the construction of a synchro-cyclotron for high-energy protons as a joint project
between Heidelberg University and the Max Planck Institute for Nuclear Physics in Heidelberg. In his personal strug-
gle against the dominance of theoreticians over the planning of experimental programs in large laboratories, Gentner
saw his own interests, as well as those of national and international experimental particle physicists, to be strongly
interwoven with the CERN-based pyramid scheme, the apex of which would be the planned 300 GeV accelerator,
which Gentner lobbied to have located in West Germany.22
In June 1965, when the decision concerning the future accelerators was still being debated by CERN member-
states and support seemed to be lacking for the immediate funding of a new 300 GeV machine, Bernardini and Gen-
tner drafted a document titled “On the Relation Between National and International Programmes,” addressed to the
CERN Scientific Policy Committee. Bernardini and Gentner argued that it was necessary to challenge the perilous
and widespread view that expensive laboratories were “an extremely costly self-generating [s]cience” that would be
of “benefit [to] a small company of 'initiates.'” In order to do so, they put forth an ambitious plan: situating medium-
size accelerators, at the base of the high-energy pyramid, in physics departments, which would result in the annual
training of many PhDs. This purely technoscientific goal of supporting the socio-professional interests of a specific
group of Western European physicists connected to CERN was enriched by lending political substance to the initia-
tive. Bernardini and Gentner stressed that their program would favor the spread of a “European scientific culture
unbounded by those more humanistic than scientific traditions which were … one of the most serious obstacles to
the development of Europe as a nation.”23 Thus, their project was framed in very strong terms as a diplomatic
endeavor that provided material means to realize the cultural unification of Europe in support of European political
integration. In 1968, this would become one of the two justifications for the establishment of the EPS that Ber-
nardini put forward.
The intellectual sources Bernardini and Gentner drew from in their proposal for European accelerator physics as
the framework for supporting European political integration were not the theoretical approaches to the integration
19Guy von Dardel wrote to V. Weisskopf on June 3, 1961: “My first reaction was one of complete unbelief and shock that the top priority experiment at
CERN, one of the biggest and most complicated and expensive, and important experiments ever done in nuclear physics, which involv(ed) three physics
groups with two bubble chambers, one cloud chamber, and enormous counters, which taxed to the utmost a big organization's resources in money,
manpower, shielding blocks and installations, and which is directly under two of CERN's directors, should be so badly prepared that a complete outsider
like me, can … show an error of almost one order of magnitude in the intensity, which is the most vital parameter in the experiment.” Quoted in Hermann
et al. (1990, p. 221).
20These were the discoveries of the CP violation in 1963 and of the Omega-minus particle in 1964. See, e.g., Pais (1986).
21Pestre & Krige (1992).
22Carson (2010); Trischler (2006). On Gentner, see Hoffmann & Schmidt-Rohr (2006).
23Bernardini, G., & Gentner, W. (1965, Jun. 14), “On the Relation Between National and International Programmes: 35th Meeting of the Scientific Policy
Committee,” CERN/SPC/0205 (http://cds.cern.ch/record/41479/files/CM-P00095049-e.pdf). Hereafter, the document is referred to as Bernardini &
Gentner (1965).
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process that were in vogue at the time. The latter were usually based on functionalist or institutional perspectives
that did not consider European identity as playing any relevant role in the process.24 The two physicists were instead
influenced by the spreading idea that European countries had one and the same culture, which had been fostered by
policies implemented by the Council of Europe since the mid-1950s. While the main overarching theme of building a
European identity was certainly connected to the defense of human rights promoted by the Western member-coun-
tries of the Council of Europe, there were also considerable attempts to fabricate a more general understanding of
European “cultural unity,” which explicitly included links with Eastern Europeans.25
A central figure in spreading this perspective from the late 1940s was Swiss philosopher and writer Denis de
Rougemont, who related his political activism for Western European federalism to the idea of European cultural
unity. According to de Rougemont, this cultural unity was constituted of shared anti-totalitarian values based on a
deep commitment to “a notion of humans and freedom.”26 In his view, the majority of Europeans—including, in prin-
ciple, those living in the Eastern part of the continent—shared these values, which were essentially centered on the
concept of individual freedom. In his explicit opposition to the Soviet regime, he maintained that the ideological bor-
ders around those culturally united would include the entire Europe, but that Soviet military rule made it impossible,
in practice, to enact these values in the Soviet Bloc countries. A key member of the Cultural Committee of the Euro-
pean Movement and actively involved in the creation of the Council of Europe in 1949, de Rougemont became
director of the European Center for Culture, established in Geneva in 1950 to promote the idea of “European spiri-
tual unity.”27 De Rougemont held significant roles in various initiatives aimed at promoting political goals through
cultural activities, often with open anti-communist objectives, especially in his capacity as president of the executive
committee of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). Established in 1950, the CCF was an advocacy group that
sought to counter the view that communist policies were more compatible with cultural endeavors than liberal dem-
ocratic policies. Covertly financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the CCF was one of the most successful
instruments of the US-sponsored cultural Cold War in promoting Western ideals and a sense of shared values
between the two sides of the Atlantic until the mid-1960s, when its connection with the CIA became public and
many of those who had taken part in its activities distanced themselves from it.28
Within the initiatives of the Council of Europe, the Committee of Cultural Experts organized a round table in
Rome in 1953, titled “The Spiritual and Cultural Unity of Europe and the Mission of Europeans in the Contemporary
World” and chaired by de Rougemont himself.29 These topics remained central to the establishment of the European
Cultural Convention in 1954 and the Council for Cultural Co-Operation in 1962. Not only were many of these activi-
ties framed in terms of a common historical European heritage, but, in the early 1960s, the Assembly of the Council
of Europe also voted to explicitly promote the concept of “cultural unity” by preparing promotional material to be
diffused to organizations and by recommending the increase of cultural and scientific exchanges with Eastern Euro-
peans.30 These programs were based on the “need to educate the public in European citizenship and foster a
24Davis Cross (2012).
25“Creation of a European Fund for Exiles, Administered by a Specialized Agency Placed Under the Supervision of the Council of Europe” [Report] (1951,
Nov. 26), Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Doc. 61, (http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=273&
lang=en); de Rougemont, D. (1955, Nov. 7), “Raising the Cultural Curtain. Role of the Council of Europe in Promoting Cultural Exchanges between East and
West—Consultative Assembly, Committee on Cultural and Scientific Questions” [Manuscript], AS/CS (7) 25 (https://rm.coe.int/09000016807a206c). For
the defense of human rights as a common cultural theme in the making of the European identity, see Buchanan (2010).
26De Rougemont (1948). For de Rougemont's ideas on European unification, see Andrén (2020); Ousselin (2006).
27“The European Centre for Culture” (2016).
28Krige (2006); Saunders (2013); Scott-Smith (2001).
29“The Spiritual and Cultural Unity of Europe and the Mission of Europeans in the Contemporary World” [Round table] (1953, Oct. 13–16), Directorate of
Information, Council of Europe, IP/639 (https://rm.coe.int/0900001680726750).
30“Civic Education and the Training of European Citizens: Course Organized by the Italian government Under the Auspices of the Council of Europe” [Course
program] (1961, Sept. 12–23), St. 6 (61) 3 (https://rm.coe.int/0900001680771d4f); “Development of Cultural Co-operation in Europe” (1961), p. 5, Resolution
214, Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe (http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?FileID=15630&lang=EN); “The Cultural Unity of
Europeans” [Commentary slides] (1961, Oct. 6), Cultural Directorate, Council of Europe, Je (61) 36 (https://rm.coe.int/09000016807718ab); “Establishment of




consciousness of Europe's cultural unity.”31 Plausibly, by the mid-1960s, the view of a European cultural unity
embedded in a common continental history became a widespread trope among Western European elites and an
ideological basis for further projects of actual scientific and cultural coordination across borders in the European
framework.
Bernardini's and Gentner's focus on the cultural unity of Europe closely follows the rhetorical tools that were
being employed by de Rougemont and the Council of Europe's initiatives at exactly the same time. In view of their
strong involvement with CERN's research activities, Bernardini and Gentner were in a particularly suitable position
to be immersed in these cultural discourses. CERN was the most ambitious intergovernmental project of scientific
cooperation at the (Western–Central) European level. Since 1949, members of the European Movement had been
among the early promoters of the laboratory, including, notoriously, de Rougemont, who had argued for a joint inter-
national scientific laboratory as a step toward stronger cultural and political European integration.32 When Bernardini
and Gentner were working at CERN, de Rougemont and the European Center for Culture were actively involved in
spreading the concept of European cultural unity in Geneva.
One might wonder, then, whether the ideological linkage between the discourse of European cultural unity and
anti-totalitarian values, so explicit in de Rougemont, was also embedded in Bernardini's and Gentner's vision at the
time. To answer this question, it is important to recognize that the Europe the two physicists were referring to at the
time was an entity defined by membership at CERN, which means they were implying the process of integration in
Western Europe. In this context, Bernardini and Gentner did not consider the ideological divides across Europe, as
they took it for granted that Western European countries were already committed to a set of liberal, anti-totalitarian
values, like those promoted by de Rougemont. In addition, the political and ideological discourse on notions of cul-
ture and values was quite vague in this document, since personal political views were not made explicit in these sorts
of institutional records. One might hypothesize that there were ideological rifts within the physics community, but
the archival sources my analysis is based on do not contain any explicit discussion on these more elaborated and,
plausibly, conflictual views. These archival records only show that, at this stage, two of the leading protagonists
seemed to be well aligned with the view promoted by de Rougemont, and that this view would be later embedded in
the EPS's programmatic outlook.
To sum up, in 1965, Bernardini, Gentner, and other leading particle physicists related to CERN were trying to
establish an integrated multinational framework at the Western(–Central) European level, which included research
and training, in the context of competition with the more successful U.S. high-energy physics. This project did not go
unquestioned within the scientific and political circles of CERN member-states. In order to justify and promote these
projects, Bernardini and Gentner aimed to give the field of high-energy physics “a broad and solid cultural value” by
appropriating the arguments spread at the time by the Council of Europe and other cultural organizations to bolster
cultural cooperation as a way of advancing political integration.33 Bernardini and Gentner, however, articulated these
themes in very original terms: the physics project they promoted was much better suited to achieving their goal of a
common recognition of European cultural unity, rather than humanistic traditions that were more prone to showing
the divisive characteristics between the various cultures of European nations. Underscoring the fact that human soci-
eties were increasingly affected by science and technology, the two physicists argued that the institutional and eco-
nomic forces in the process of European integration should be sustained by moral and cultural forces related to “an
effective modern scientific culture.”34 In this way, Bernardini and Gentner confronted the risk of the public perceiv-
ing big particle-physics laboratories as an expensive and useless technoscientific playground by providing a
31“Draft Report First Meeting Committee on Out-of-School Education, Study Group Popular Education/Adult Education” (1962, Mar. 20–23), CCC/EES/
Misc (62) 6 (https://rm.coe.int/0900001680725c2c); “XII Course of European Studies” [Program course] (1962, Sept. 14), CCC/EÉS/lnf (62) 36 (https://rm.
coe.int/0900001680725b66).
32Hermann et al. (1990, pp. 68–69); see also Schopper (2009, pp. 179–183).
33Bernardini & Gentner (1965, p. 1).
34Bernardini & Gentner (1965, p. 6). In part, this argument was reminiscent of a plea for the role of pure science, in the European culture, as providing
motivation to financially support the expensive high-energy physics laboratories set up by English cosmic-ray physicist and Nobel laureate Cecil. F. Powell a
few months earlier: Powell (1964).
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completely different image of these endeavors. Physics was presented as the common European language, and phys-
ics laboratories as arenas suitable for the pursuit of political action toward greater integration. This view became a
kind of mantra for the particle physicists involved at CERN, who consistently depicted the CERN climate as being
particularly favorable to an international scientific cooperation beyond the influence of politics.35
4 | THE BIRTH OF THE EPS IN ITALY
While the role of physics in human societies and the cultural unity of Europe would become major tropes in the pub-
lic discourse on the foundation of the EPS, there were very practical concerns that prompted Bernardini to become a
major promoter of greater European cooperation in physics. The future of particle physics in Europe was only one of
two problems that concerned Bernardini at the time. The other problem was the status of physics journals in Europe.
As president of the Italian Physical Society and managing editor of the society's periodical, Il Nuovo Cimento, Ber-
nardini felt very strongly about the difficulties faced by European physics journals, especially in light of the success
of the American Physical Society's publications, The Physical Review and its various sister- and sub-journals.36 Ber-
nardini and other leading European physicists considered European journals to be too numerous, of lower quality,
and influenced by local and national interests. Bernardini initiated attempts to improve the status of Il Nuovo Cimento
as soon as he became managing editor in 1963.37 By 1965, he had resolved that the best strategy for modifying the
publishing practices of the journal would be a process of internationalization: in the editorial board, in the authorship
of the journal, and, more importantly, in the standardization of refereeing practices.38
The future of large laboratories and of physics journals in Europe, both in a framework of increasing competition
with the US, led Gilberto Bernardini to invite some non-Italian nuclear and high-energy physicists from Europe to the
Congress of the Italian Physical Society, which was held in Bologna in November 1965.39 The discussions at the
Bologna congress were carefully engineered to individuate the problems of the physics enterprise that could be
effectively addressed through greater European cooperation.40 In line with this scheme, at a dinner party during the
congress Bernardini proposed the creation of a European forum for discussing the problems of physics journals, as
well as of large particle-physics laboratories, in order to find common solutions.41 The attendees welcomed the initia-
tive, which was immediately implemented by Bernardini himself, with the support of the Italian Physical Society and
the Italian government. A few months later, Bernardini organized the inaugural meeting of the proposed forum for
European physicists, which was titled “Meeting on European Collaboration in Physics.” Held in Pisa in April 1966,
the meeting was extremely successful, as Bernardini was able to mobilize a large network of European physicists
who had been closely collaborating with each other at CERN, and to secure political and financial support from the
35A few years later, Gentner made this claim explicit by underlining the diplomatic role of CERN in the international understanding in Europe, including the
relations with the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries: Gentner (1971). On Gentner's view on the role of technoscientific collaboration and large laboratories in
the process of European integration and in easing Cold War tensions, see Trischler (2006).
36For the editorial practices and diffusion of APS journals, see Kaiser (2012); Khelfaoui & Gingras (2019); Lalli (2014).
37Bernardini (1963).
38“[The] ever growing collaboration [of European and extra-European scientists] will not only contribute to a progressive reduction of publication time
but—which in our eyes has much greater desert—ever more accentuate the international character of Il Nuovo Cimento.” Bernardini (1965, p. viii). See also
“Estratto del Verbale della 106a Riunione del Consiglio di Presidenza della SIF” (1965); “Estratto del verbale della 107a Riunion del Consiglio di Presidenza
della S.I.F.” (1965); “Lettera al Direttore del prof. R. Gatto e di un gruppo di professori di fisica” (1965). These discussions were held in connection with the
establishment a new series of Il Nuovo Cimento starting from 1966, when it was split in two journals: Il Nuovo Cimento A, focusing on particle physics, and Il
Nuovo Cimento B for papers in all other fields. It is worthwhile to note that this split occurred even earlier than a similar one implemented by the APS with
the creation of Physical Review A and Physical Review B in 1970: Kaiser (2012).
39“Official inauguration” (1968); Bernardini (1972).
40“This year … more than ever we would like to share and discuss with some European friends how to improve in the future the activities we should
maintain, and how to discontinue others more related to a too nationalistic and provincial past.” Bernardini, G. to Gentner [Letter] (1965, Sept. 22), Nr. 72,
Nachlass Wolfgang Gentner–Rep. 68A, III. Abt, Archiv der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Berlin, Germany (hereafter, NWG).
41Bernardini, G. to van Hove [Letter] (1966, Jan. 14), CERN-ARCH-DGR-LVH-105, CERN DG-Research, Léon Van Hove Collection, CERN Archives,
Geneva, Switzerland.
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Italian government. Sponsored by the president of the Italian Republic, Giuseppe Saragat, the meeting was attended
by about 90 physicists (Figures 1 and 2).42
The problems chosen as topics of discussion confirmed the main interests of the physicists involved: physics
publications, and the relations between large particle-physics laboratories and university departments. Even though
F IGURE 1 Gilberto Bernardini addresses
the audience at the Pisa meeting in April
1966, Raccolta fotografica Scuola Normale
Superiore, Meeting, Meeting on European
Collaboration in Physics 16-17 Aprile 1966,
Centro Archivistico della Scuola Normale
Superiore, Pisa, Italy
F IGURE 2 Participants at the Pisa
meeting in April 1966, Raccolta fotografica
Scuola Normale Superiore, Meeting, Meeting
on European Collaboration in Physics 16-17
Aprile 1966, Centro Archivistico della Scuola
Normale Superiore, Pisa, Italy
42Radicati & Zichichi (1966, p. 11). See also Gentner, W. to Bernardini [Letter] (1966, Apr. 27), Nr. 105/2–2, NWG.
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Bernardini's introductory talk called the conference the first meeting of the “not-yet-born European Physical Soci-
ety,” the foundation of such a European society was only one of the four topics discussed during the meeting and
was not necessarily perceived as the central one by the participants.43 Many felt that the problem of publications
was in fact the most pressing: “[i]t is the anarchy in scientific publication which we cannot tolerate much longer,” as
British theoretical physicist Frederick C. Frank put it.44
Participation was as selective as the choice of topics. Those attending the meeting were certainly not represen-
tative of the entire European physics community. It was European in the same sense as CERN: a community of
nuclear and particle physicists who were already cooperating in various ways and who were mostly working on the
Western side of the Iron Curtain. Under these circumstances, there was serious discussion as to whether it would
make more sense to create a society for high-energy and nuclear physicists only, and perhaps to later extend mem-
bership to other fields. In his introduction, Bernardini explicitly recognized that the physicists attending the meeting
did not represent the entire European community of physicists, but only a part—geographically, politically, and the-
matically. It was considered the right strategy, however, to set the agenda starting from this supportive network
composed of people sharing similar experiences, concerns, and aims (a “group composed of friends and friends of fri-
ends” as Bernardini put it), and build a more representative society in a second stage.45
Of the four topics of the meeting, Dutch theoretical physicist Sybren de Groot had been asked to open the
discussions on the question of “whether there is the case for a European society of physicists.”46 In his talk, de
Groot supported the creation of a society with a much greater purpose than that envisioned when the Pisa meet-
ing was being planned. He did so by identifying two main justifications for its establishment. The first one closely
resembled the “European scientific culture” argument put forward by Bernardini and Gentner. Taking for granted
that the European continent had one and the same culture, de Groot argued that physics, in view of its long-lasting
international practices and its recent need for multinational cooperation on large-scale projects, was a suitable
arena for the recognition and realization of this cultural unity. The second justification concerned the many useful,
coordinating actions that this society might fulfill, especially by exporting the CERN model to other branches of
physics.47
However, de Groot also underlined the difficulties in the construction of such a society, the most challenging
of which was the necessity of defining its range of operation in connection to existing institutions, and especially
to the national physical societies of European countries. This led to the problem of deciding what kind of structure
the future society should assume, whether a free association of physicists or a federation of existing national soci-
eties.48 In the discussion following de Groot's talk, the attendees decided that steps should be taken to form a
comprehensive European physical society. A majority determined that the future society should not be limited to
nuclear and high-energy physicists, but should include all the subdisciplines of physics in dedicated specialist sec-
tions.49 The discussants, however, left the issue of the society's structure unaddressed. To this end, Bernardini
was given the mandate to establish a working group and to ask the national societies for their opinions about the
proposed society.
43Bernardini (1966, p. 12).
44Frank (1966). Some of the attendees even understood that the main issue was to discuss the future of Il Nuovo Cimento, which Bernardini hoped to
transform into a European journal for nuclear physics. This conflicted with the status of the journal Nuclear Physics, which had been founded in 1956 as the
preferred venue for publication of CERN-related research results. See also Vlachý (1968).
45Bernardini (1966, p. 13).
46De Groot (1966, p. 23).
47Apart from the relevance of the CERN model, which was later downplayed, these arguments were essentially identical to those later used by Bernardini
when the society was founded. See “Official inauguration” (1968).
48This discussion quite closely resembled the then-ongoing discussions concerning different geopolitical views of the future of the European integration
process as a confederation or federation of member states. See Loth (2015).
49Maraventano (1966).
LALLI 11
5 | CONTROVERSY OVER TWO CONCEPTIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY: A FREE ASSOCIATION OF INDIVIDUALS VERSUS A
CONFEDERATION OF SOCIETIES
The majority of the attendees at the Pisa conference agreed to create a truly European physical society, which would
include all physics fields, and possibly all European nations regardless of the political divide of the Cold War. Despite
this agreement, the initial composition of the steering committee established to this end was still unrepresentative,
both scientifically and geopolitically. It was limited almost exclusively to high-energy and nuclear physicists. More-
over, there were only two physicists working in Eastern Europe: Polish particle physicist Marian Danysz and Soviet
plasma physicist Lev Artsimovich.50
At the time, Danysz was a natural choice for the preferential representative of Eastern Europe in physics. Like Ber-
nardini, Danysz was a cosmic-ray and nuclear physicist. Since the 1950s, he had been building robust international networks
thanks to his achievements in cosmic-ray research and through his connection to the CERN environment. He became one
of the first two deputy directors of the international particle-physics center for the socialist countries, the Joint Institute for
Nuclear Research (JINR), when it was established in Dubna, Russia in 1956. In this capacity, he tried to strengthen the links
between the JINR and CERN and, more broadly, among European particle physicists by promoting the exchange of special-
ists in the 1960s.51 In 1964, Danysz and CERN director-general Victor Weisskopf were successful in obtaining the status of
CERN observer-member for Poland, the only Eastern European country to be granted this status.52
Since his welcoming address at the Pisa conference, Bernardini had made it explicit that the society he envisaged
was based on a definition of Europe as an inclusive continent that overcame political barriers.53 Bernardini immedi-
ately tried to involve the USSR in the initiative by inviting the Soviet nuclear and plasma physicist Lev Artsimovich to
join the steering committee.54 Unlike Danysz, the choice of Artsimovich as a possible representative of the USSR
was not related to the CERN network. Plausibly, this was mostly due to the double role Artsimovich played in Soviet
scientific-diplomatic affairs. Within the centralized Soviet scientific-political system, Artsimovich held a leadership
position thanks to his role in the Soviet nuclear weaponry and energy programs.55 In international relations, he was a
well-respected Soviet spokesperson for international agreements on disarmament, which he pursued through his role
as chairman of the Soviet Pugwash Committee from 1963.56 Bernardini had the opportunity to meet Artsimovich a
few months before he began to promote the idea of a European Physical Society, at the Pugwash conference in Ven-
ice in April 1965, of which Bernardini was chairman.57 Apparently, however, these attempts to involve Artsimovich
did not succeed. While Artsimovich continued to be listed as a member of the steering committee in official
50The membership of the steering committee increased over the months. The first official list of November 1966 contained 21 members beyond
Bernardini: English accelerator physicist John B. Adams, who had been director-general at CERN in 1960–1961; Lev Artsimovich; West German theoretical
physicist Fritz Bopp, former president of the German Physical Society; English particle physicist Clifford C. Butler, then chairman of the CERN Track
Chamber Committee; Marian Danysz; Sybren de Groot; Israeli nuclear physicist Amos de-Shalit, chief executive of the Weizmann Institute of Science; US-
based French mathematical physicist Cécile DeWitt-Morette, organizer of the Les Houches Summer School of Physics; Swedish physicist Sigvard Eklund,
director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Wien; Wolfgang Gentner; French physicist Bernard P. Gregory, then CERN director-general;
theoretical particle physicist James Hamilton at NORDITA, Copenhagen; Swiss theoretical physicist Josef-Maria Jauch at the University of Geneva; Finnish
theoretical nuclear physicist Pekka Jauho; Danish theoretical nuclear physicist Christian Møller; Spanish nuclear physicist José M. Otero, chairman of the
Junta de Energia Nuclear in Spain; French nuclear physicist Francis Perrin, high commissioner of the French Atomic Energy Commission; CERN-based
French physicist Charles Peyrou; British nuclear physicist Thomas G. “Gerry” Pickavance, director of the Rutherford High Energy Laboratory; Swedish
physicist Erik Rudberg, permanent secretary of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences; Austrian-American theoretical physicist Victor Weisskopf, CERN
director-general between 1961 and 1966. From this list, there is no need to emphasize the strong presence of elite physicists connected to CERN and
nuclear physics. “List of the People Who Will Attend the Meeting of the Steering Committee at CERN” (1966, Nov. 25), Nr. 105/2–2, NWG.
51Lock (1975a; 1975b).
52“CERN Biographies—Marian Danysz” (1983).
53Bernardini (1966). This is also clear from his very first letter to proposed members of the steering committee, in which he mentioned the International
Center for Theoretical Physics in Trieste as a possible location for the first meeting, because the center was “supposed to be a free 'zone of exchange'
between East and West.” Bernardini, G. to Gentner [Letter] (1966, May 26), Nr. 105/2–2, NWG.
54Bernardini, G. to Boris P. Konstantinov [Letter] (1968, Jan. 22), Folder correspondence K-L, AGB/EPS; “List of the People Who Will Attend the Meeting
of the Steering Committee, CERN” (1966, Nov. 25), Nr. 105/2–2, NWG.
55Holloway (1994); Josephson (1996).
56Evangelista (1999).
57Proceedings of the Fourteenth Pugwash Conference (1965).
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documents, he and the other Soviet scientists invited to the meetings never replied before early 1968, as was often
the case given the Soviet Union's strong political and ideological control over participation in international
programs.58
From the start, the major problem was the structure of the society. The most committed members of the steering
committee firmly believed that in order to be vital and active, the society had to be a free association of individuals.59 Rep-
resentatives of national physical societies thought otherwise. Most of them pushed strongly against the free-association
scheme in favor of a federation of existing national societies (or equivalent national bodies for countries where national
physical societies did not exist). Most vocal in this attitude was the French Physical Society. In their detailed official assess-
ment of the proposal for the EPS, the French Physical Society did not deem the establishment of a European society “une
nécessité primordial.” Many doubts were raised about the range of activities that a European society could actually per-
form, especially in relation to the coordination of scientific publications. To the French society, the real advantage of the
EPS would be to favor East–West scientific exchanges through the inclusion of physicists from all Europe, “de l'Europe du
CERN à celle de DOUBNA.” And if this was the main purpose, the French society argued, the EPS had necessarily to be a
federation of the existing national societies, both for financial and political reasons: it was much easier for Eastern Euro-
pean physicists to participate in the activities of such international bodies as representatives of institutional entities.60
In part, these arguments were true, especially for what the limitation to a free association of individuals would
have implied for the participation of Eastern European scientists. Under the centralized organization of socialist
countries, individuals could be members of international bodies only as official representatives of institutions such as
national academies. This was the structure of international non-governmental institutions such as the International
Council of Scientific Unions and the various international unions whose membership was based on the notion of
national representation.61 Participation in international societies based on individual membership posed enormous
challenges to physicists in socialist countries.62
It is unclear, however, if the Western European physicists involved in the committee were fully aware of this
issue.63 Some members of the steering committee rather understood that some national societies were pushing for
the formation of a federation of societies because their very existence would have been endangered by a strong and
successful European association of physicists.64 These members feared that if the society were created as a federa-
tion, it would become a bargaining forum where the largest and most powerful national societies would impose their
own interests on the European society. This implied that the society would not be independent of politics, nor of the
influence of national governments.65 In this sense, the federative structure was viewed as a betrayal of the interna-
tional spirit of the society as it had been initially envisaged.66
58Various lists of the steering committee from 1967 to 1968 in AGB/EPS. Bernardini reported about the lack of replies from Artsimovich and other Soviet
scientists in Bernardini, G. to Boris P. Konstantinov [Letter], (1968, Jan. 22), Folder correspondence K-L, AGB/EPS. For more on the framework of the
Soviet-controlled participation in international programs of Eastern European scientists, see Olšáková (2017; 2018).
59Peyrou, for example, wrote: “There is a strong wish among many physicists that the European Physical Society should be based on individual
membership. Only in this way can the society be a living and active body.” Peyrou, C. to Bernardini [Letter] (1967, Apr. 25), Nr. 105/2–2, NWG. Similar
views were expressed in Jauch, J.-M. to Bernardini [Letter] (1966, Apr. 26), Folder correspondence I-J, AGB/EPS.
60Societe Française de Physique (1967, Jan.), “Societe Europeenne de Physique” [Manuscript], Nr. 105/2–2, NWG.
61Greenaway (1996).
62For the importance of this issue in what concerns the participation of Soviet scientists in international scientific bodies, see Lalli (2017). For the East
German case, see Niederhut (2007).
63In his response, the president of the Polish Physical Society, Wojciech Rubinowicz, strongly argued for the federative solution, emphasizing the
difficulties for Eastern European physicists, but mostly on the grounds of financial obstacles rather than political impediments. Rubinowicz, W. to
Bernardini [Letter] (1966, Jul. 8), Nr. 105/2–2, NWG.
64Jauch, for example, expressed this concern in the following terms: “It seemed to me obvious, from the beginning, that the society would have individual
physicists as members, and nothing that I heard during the meeting convinced me otherwise. In fact, I could not understand why this question came up at
all, until somebody pointed out to me that certain national societies might feel threatened by the existence of a strong and successful European society.”
Jauch, J.-M. to Bernardini [Letter] (1966, Apr. 26), Folder correspondence I-J, AGB/EPS. Identical views are in Peyrou, C. to Bernardini [Letter] (1967, Apr.
25), Nr. 105/2–2, NWG.
65Béné, G. (1966, Nov.) “A propos d'une Future Societé de Physique Européenne: Adhésions individuelles ou fédération de societés nationales? (FSN)
Réfléxions basées sur le fonctionnement du Groupement et des colloques Ampère entre 1552 et 1966” [Manuscript], Nr.105/2–2, NWG; and Béné, G.
(1967) “For a European Physical Society,” Nr.105/2–2, NWG.
66“The influence of the national physical societies should certainly not be too high because, otherwise, it would completely change the character and the
scientific goal of this new association.” Gentner, W. to Bernardini [Letter] (1968, Mar. 4), Nr. 105/2–1, NWG.
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A subtler political problem with the federative structure concerned the definition of Europe. This problem was
identified by two physicists who became particularly active in providing possible structural solutions for the society
to prevent it from becoming a federation of national societies. These were Swiss experimental physicist Georges
Béné and French experimental physicist at CERN Charles Peyrou. They voiced their concerns that the federative
solution would imply the necessity to clearly define European borders by selecting which national associations had
the right to become members. The political problems this posed were substantial. What should be done about the
USSR and the German Democratic Republic (GDR)? (At that time, the GDR was not recognized by many European
states, and the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG] had implemented the Hallstein Doctrine in foreign policy so that
recognition of the GDR would be considered an unfriendly act.) Or what to do with non-European Mediterranean
countries, such as Israel and Turkey? Discussions on these problems were considered extremely dangerous as they
threatened the very existence of a society that had not yet been created.67
Béné was an expert in these matters because he had been involved since the early 1950s in the construction of
grassroots international scientific associations as the permanent secretary of the Groupement Ampère, an interna-
tional scientific association of magnetic resonance specialists. Established in 1952 as a France-based initiative, the
semi-informal Groupement Ampère had been growing significantly in the international arena, and even included
Eastern European scientists.68 Because of the success of the group (see Figure 3), it was also proposed as a possible
model for the EPS, and Béné would be included in the steering committee by virtue of his experience.
To overcome these difficulties, Peyrou advanced a model that he declared to have been borrowed from the fed-
eral constitution of Switzerland. Peyrou proposed two kinds of membership: individual and corporate, both of which
could be represented in the governing body of the society, with a slight majority for representatives of individual
F IGURE 3 Composition of the Ampère group in October 1965. Numbers correspond to the amount of individual
members for each European country. In Béné, G. (1967), “For a European Physical Society,” p. 9, Nr.105/2–2, NWG
67Peyrou, C. to Bernardini [Letter] (1967, Apr. 25), Nr. 105/2–2, NWG; “A propos d'une Future Societé de Physique Européenne: Adhésions individuelles




members. Members of the steering committee and delegates of the national societies were to meet twice within
1 year to find a negotiated solution to the two extremes: a federation or a free association of individuals. At the com-
mittee meeting held in London in May 1967, an agreement was reached that followed and extended the proposal
made by Peyrou, who later confessed that the only reason he joined these early discussions was to try to prevent
the society from taking the form of a federation of existing national societies.69
A parallel but far less contentious issue concerned the role of the society with respect to different sub-disciplin-
ary domains. After the first meeting of the steering committee in Geneva in November 1966, the future society's
coordinating framework for organizing dedicated international conferences at the European level was considered
more useful to areas of research other than those of nuclear and high-energy physics, which constituted the core dis-
ciplinary domain of most members.70 By the same token, a proposal was made to include “a reasonable representa-
tion of the main field of physics in the executive committee” in order to avoid a lack of equilibrium among the fields
in the society.71
In London, the first draft constitution of this hybrid society was prepared, including both individual and corpo-
rate membership. While such a mixed solution had been proposed very early on in the negotiations, the distribution
of powers between representatives of national societies and representatives of individual members in the council
and its executive committee remained controversial. While the proponents of the free-association scheme
demanded greater representation for those elected by individual members, the final outcome gave national societies
a stronger weight in the council. The issue was finally solved by defining the individual members of the participating
national societies as individual members of the EPS. The constitution, however, maintained the idea that most elec-
ted members of the council were representatives of national societies. This was also the impression that was com-
municated in public, where the society was soon described as a “loose federation of national physical societies, with
provision for individual membership.”72
Apart from the structure of the society as a hybrid individual-corporate association, the main point of contention
at the London meeting concerned the function of the society. In the discussion, the national societies achieved that
the role of the EPS was considerably scaled down from the initial ambitions. The society was defined as “a service
organization i.e. providing interchange of information, organizing conference[s] and other meetings, co-ordinating
publications. It is not intended as a quasi-political organization attempting to re-organize physical research, for exam-
ple, on a supra-national basis.”73 This definition was meant to implement the first point of the programmatic state-
ment written during the previous meeting at CERN in November 1966, which drew a boundary between the EPS
and the national physical societies, as requested by the latter.74 This wording summarized the idea that the society
should favor coordination between national societies, rather than being substituted for or competing with them. In
addition, the society's activities should be limited to those areas that were deemed uncontroversial in terms of
national interests. A few months later, in September 1967, an executive board of the steering committee was agreed
upon in Geneva that would take care of all administrative and organizational issues.75 Albeit not in the way that
some had hoped for, in London “the society evolved from a concept into something definite—an effective new real-
ity,” as Bernardini would later recall.76 By September 1967, the society had a draft constitution, an executive board,
and initial plans for including the main areas of research in European physics.
69“I jumped into the breach because I saw a very strong danger in the pure federative European Physical Society.” Peyrou, C. to Bernardini [Letter] (1968,
Apr. 5), Folder correspondence O-P, AGB/EPS.
70“Frames of Activities of a European Physical Society, Working group Nr. 1” [Report] (1966, Nov. 25), Nr.105/2–2, NWG.
71Béné, G. (1967), “For a European Physical Society,” Nr.105/2–2, NWG.
72Press (1968, p. 390).
73“Report on the Meeting of the Steering Committee of the European Physical Society, London” (1967, May 16), Nr. 105/2–1, NWG. Emphasis by the
author.
74“The activities of EPS should be confined, on the whole, to areas not covered by the various national physical societies.” “Frames of Activities of a
European Physical Society, Working Group Nr. 1” [Report] (1966, Nov. 25), Nr.105/2–2, NWG.
75“Report on the Meeting Held in Geneva on 20 September 1967 to Settle the Secretariat of the Steering Committee” (1967, Sept. 20), Nr.105/2–1, NWG.
The Bureau was composed of Bernardini as head, Mrs. Lorette Etienne-Amberg as scientific secretary, Gentner, Béné, J. M. Jauch, L. Jansen, and L. Cohen.
76Bernardini (1972, p. 36).
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The hybrid society, however, still suffered from the political problems of the full federative solution, most nota-
bly the issue of how exactly to define Europe. Until the London meeting, Polish physicists had been the only repre-
sentatives of Eastern European countries actively participating in the steering committee's meetings and
correspondence exchanges. The hybrid character of the society now made it mandatory, in order to build a truly
European (and not only Western–Central European) society, to soon obtain confirmation that a sizeable number of
Eastern European physical societies could join immediately.
6 | COLD WAR DIPLOMACY: THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE EASTWARD
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EPS
In September 1967, the EPS board proposed a final meeting of the steering committee in Prague in order to increase
the participation of physicists from the Eastern Bloc.77 At Bernardini's request, Italian physicist Giuseppe Occhialini
pursued informal attempts to discuss the matter with Eastern European physicists during the Marie Curie centenary
symposium organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Warsaw in October 1967.78 Occhialini reported
that there was widespread enthusiasm about this project, but there were a number of points of contention as well.
Occhialini pointed out that the steering committee membership contained a “diplomatic error.” The West German
exclusive mandate policy was implicitly accepted by listing the two West German physicists as coming from “Ger-
many,” which was politically unacceptable to Eastern European physicists. Moreover, Occhialini reported that “the
proposed structure should be completely reviewed by a truly representative steering [c]ommittee containing an
appropriate representation from Eastern Europe.”79 This, in part, might have been a request from non-Soviet Eastern
European physicists to overcome the hierarchic structure of Soviet Bloc participation in international institutions,
which Doubravka Olšáková dubbed “restricted internationalism.”80 Occhialini's assessment was immediately trans-
formed into a strategy of contacting scholars in Central and Eastern European countries to significantly enlarge the
membership of the steering committee with the inclusion of seven physicists from six socialist countries, taking into
account the issue of national representation as well as the role of established national institutions in the choice of
new members.81
The difficulties for physicists in socialist countries in joining a private international body as individual members
were raised again at the first meeting of the new steering committee in Geneva in January 1968. The question was
how to avoid the official involvement of national governments, considering that Eastern Europeans would only be
able to join through corporate membership. In the discussion about fees to be paid from different countries, the issue
was raised as to whether convertible currencies should be imposed, as had been done by international unions and
the like. One of the new Eastern European members of the steering committee, Czechoslovak solid-state physicist
Jan Tauc, emphasized that this rule would constitute a serious problem for Eastern European physicists and groups,
77“Report on the Meeting Held in Geneva on 20 September 1967 to Settle the Secretariat of the Steering Committee” (1967, Sept. 20), Nr.105/2–1, NWG.
78Maria Skłodowska-Curie Centenary Committee & IAEA (1968).
79Occhialini, G. to Bernardini [Letter] (1967, Nov. 6), Nr. 105/2–1, NWG.
80Olšáková (2019).
81Bernardini, G. to Occhialini [Letter] (1967, Oct. 13), Folder correspondence O-P, AGB/EPS; Etienne-Amberg, L. to Gentner, Jauch, and Cohen [Letter]
(1967, Nov. 22), Folder Etienne-Amberg 1967, AGB/EPS. The seven physicists to be contacted were: Arthur Lösche (DDR), full professor at the Physics
Institute of the Karl Marx University in Prague and long-standing member of Groupement Ampère; Jan Tauc (Czechoslovakia), director of the Institute for
Solid State Physics at the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences; Gyorgy Szigeti (Hungary), secretary-general of the Roland Eötvös Physical Society of
Hungary; Robert Blinc (Yugoslavia), expert in the use of nuclear magnetic resonance in solid state physics at the Jožef Stefan Institute, and also a
participant in the activities of Groupement Ampère; Ion Ursu (Rumania), director of the Nuclear, Physics, Optics and Electromagnetic Department and Vice-
Rector of the University of Cluj; Lev Okun (USSR), renowned high-energy theoretical physicist at the Institute for Theoretical and Experimental Physics in
Moscow; and Nobel Laureate Igor Tamm (USSR). “Report on the Meeting Held in Geneva on 14 November 1967 to Settle the Question of Place and Date
for the Next Meeting of the Steering Committee” (1967, Nov. 14), Nr. 105/2–1, NWG. By February 1968, the membership of the steering committee had
significantly increased to 40 members, and included representativeness of both national and sub-disciplinary communities (almost twice as many as the
first steering committee): “List of the Members of the Steering Committee of the EPS” (1968, Feb. 28), Folder 1968 Finanziamenti Budget, AGB/EPS.
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as the official involvement of national governments was mandated when using convertible currencies.82 A majority
accepted the request to keep the fees in non-convertible currencies on the grounds that, in spite of the hybrid struc-
ture that included corporate members, most still considered the new entity as having the status of a “free associa-
tion” with “no connection to the governments” as a basic requirement.83
In the following months, Tauc was instrumental in the realization of the next meeting of the steering commit-
tee in Prague on May 3–4, 1968. The social and political conditions could not have been more fitting. The liberal
reforms enacted in some of the countries in the Warsaw Pact, especially those in Czechoslovakia by the newly
elected first secretary of the communist party of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcˇek, increased hopes for the
strategy's success.84 To facilitate the participation of Eastern European physicists in the society, opening a branch
of the secretariat in an Eastern European country was also proposed at the Prague meeting. In the political climate
of the Prague Spring, the choice of where to settle the future Eastern European logistic center fell on Prague,
where the branch secretariat was to deal with financial and organizational matters of Soviet Bloc participation in
the EPS.85
In this climate, the diplomatic function of the society was made public in a number of speeches. Bernardini
opened the January meeting in Geneva with a university lecture that again emphasized the theme of European cul-
tural unity based on common historical roots, in which the Renaissance had played a fundamental role. He described
CERN as the model to be followed for the entire physics discipline in order to pursue greater cooperation in Europe.
In other cases, international cooperation had been far less successful and had led to “general confusion which slow[ed]
down the scientific and technical evolution so strongly recommended to our continent in the race for primacy in the
civilized world.” The EPS was publicly depicted as a way to challenge this confusion by linking all European physi-
cists so that Europe could solve its problems in the path to becoming “in a maybe remote, but certain future a
unique, highly civilized nation.”86 Similar views were expounded a few months later in a public speech by
Czechoslovak nuclear physicist František Janouch, who was a central figure in the organization of the Prague
meeting and would soon become a member of the EPS bureau. In a world that increasingly relied on science and
technology, Janouch argued, extreme specialization and information overload seriously threatened the capacity of
physicists to understand advances in other subfields, thus undermining the cultural value of scientific progress for
“human civilization.” The EPS was a way to solve this problem and to thereby “positively influence our divided
world and civilization.” This clearly implied a diplomatic role for the society. Like Bernardini, Janouch regarded the
search for European unity in physics (with respect to both national and sub-disciplinary divisions) to be a contribu-
tion to “European cultural unity” and to East–West peaceful relations.87 By the same token, the rector of the
Charles University in Prague and a strong supporter of the Prague Spring, neurologist Oldřich Starý, enthusiasti-
cally welcomed the participants of the Prague meeting, emphasizing the fundamentality of scientific cooperation
to the “awareness of the unity of European culture.”88
82Tauc said: “IUPAP is different because it is an organization which is approved by the Government and so it is easier than the European Physical Society
which will have another structure and I think it is quite essential that the fees could be paid also in non-convertible currency”: “Outline of Legal Problems
Concerning the European Physical Society” [Transcript] (1968, Jan. 30), Tape 4, p. 3, Folder Meeting of the Steering Committee in Geneva 30/01/1968,
AGB/EPS.
83“Outline of Legal Problems Concerning the European Physical Society” [Transcript] (1968, Jan. 30), Tape 4, p. 3, Folder Meeting of the Steering
Committee in Geneva 30/01/1968, AGB/EPS. This comment was made by Bernardini.
84Bernardini, G. to F. Šorm [Letter] (1968, Feb. 6); Tauc, J. to Bernardini [Letter] (1968, Feb. 29); Bernardini, G. To Tauc [Letter] (1968, Mar, 29), Folder
correspondence S-T, AGB/EPS. Tauc was not a member of the Communist party and had been allowed to travel only because of his high scientific
standing, as recognized by high-ranking Soviet scientists. During the Prague Spring, Tauc's situation significantly improved and he became director of the
Institute of Physics of the Charles University: Cardona et al. (2011).
85“Information Bulletin Concerning the European Physical Society, Issued by the Geneva Secretariat of the Steering Committee” (1968, Jul.), p. 7, Nr. 105/
1–2, NWG.
86Bernardini, G. (1968, Jan. 29), “First Steps Towards the Creation of the European Physical Society” [Speech], Folder Meeting of the Steering Committee
in Geneva 30/01/1968, AGB/EPS. Emphasis by the author.
87Janouch, F. (1968, Apr.), “On the Foundation of a European Physical Society” [Speech], Folder Prague Meeting May 3–4, 1968, AGB/EPS.
88Starý, O. (1968, May 3), “Welcoming address in 'Report on the General Session,'” Folder 79.5, Series 7, Archivio Occhialini-Dilworth, Library of Physics
Department, University of Milan, Milan, Italy (hereafter AOD).
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While publicly celebrated as a major contribution to the recognition of European cultural unity, the eastward
expansion of the society's participation made the definition of European borders a delicate matter of diplomatic con-
tention between physicists, as some had anticipated.89 In January 1968, the working group on the draft constitution
had proposed changes to the constitution's text by allowing the participation of Europe's neighboring countries.90
The vagueness in the definition of the composition of the society, however, constituted a major issue for Eastern
European physicists, who pressed for stricter adherence to a geographical delimitation.91
The main reason behind the request to clearly define the European borders was to avoid the official inclusion of
the Israeli Physical Society, because the Soviet Union and other Soviet Bloc countries had disrupted diplomatic rela-
tions with Israel after the Six-Day War in June 1967. International scientific meetings and conferences were deeply
affected by this diplomatic rupture: Israeli scholars were prevented from attending meetings in Eastern Europe, and
Eastern European scholars did not receive permission from their countries' political authorities to visit Israel. This sit-
uation was shattering to its very fundament the principle of the right to free circulation of persons, which interna-
tional scientific bodies were trying to implement through official resolutions.92 Eastern European physicists clearly
saw the official inclusion of Israel in the EPS as a political issue.
Israeli physicists, on the other hand, had been very active in the establishment of the society since the earli-
est phases.93 Israeli nuclear physicist Amos de-Shalit had been a member of the steering committee since its for-
mation. Furthermore, the Israeli Weizmann Institute of Science had been one of the few organizations to have
financially supported the society in the early phases, prior to its foundation.94 By the time Eastern European
physicists had actively joined the discussion, the inclusion of Israel was taken for granted by those from Western
Europe. Even before the meeting in Prague, Bernardini tried to make the inclusion of Israel in the society a fait
accompli for his Eastern European colleagues.95 In Prague, Eastern European physicists made a last-ditch attempt
to exclude Israel during the discussion about Article 2.1 of the draft constitution: “the purpose of the Society is
and shall be to contribute to and promote the advancement of physics, in Europe and in neighbouring countries.”
They requested an explicit list of all the countries covered under this wording. However, Western European rep-
resentatives in the constitution working-group firmly resisted this request, leaving the general assembly as the
supreme authority on this matter, de facto assuring that Israeli institutional bodies would be accepted in the
venture.96
The other major political issue was the participation of the Soviet Union. Even though some Western European
physicists were not in favor of its inclusion in the society, it was soon realized that the involvement of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences was essential to gaining maximum participation from Eastern European countries.97 However,
the participation of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and other national academies in Eastern Europe posed an
89“Working group A: Draft Constitution, Meeting of the Steering Committee” [Report] (1968, May 3), Nr.105/1–2, NWG.
90“The purpose of the Society is to contribute to the progress of physics in Europe and its neighbourhood.” “Conclusions of the Working Group of the
Draft Constitution, Meeting of the Steering Committee” [Report] (1968, Jan. 30), p. 1, Nr. 105/2–1, NWG.
91Excerpt from Letter from Professor Lösche (1968, Jan. 11), in “European Physical Society—Comments concerning Draft Constitution,” p. 3 [Report], Nr.
105/2–1 NWG. Arthur Lösche had been the first East German physicist invited to become a member of the steering committee; see Béné G. to Lösche
[Letter] (1967, Nov. 20), Folder correspondence K-L, AGB/EPS.
92For an emblematic case, see, e.g., Lalli (2017); Martinez (2019).
93Katzir-Katchalsky, A. to Bernardini [Letter] (1966, Jun. 13), Nr. 105–2/2, NWG.
94De-Shalit, A. to Bernardini [Letter] (1967, Dec. 1), Folder correspondence C-D, AGB/EPS.
95“The European frontiers are not at all rigid and fixed. Of course, they are not extended to all of the world, and the true European countries are to be
considered in requests to join the future Society. However, such countries as Israel and the Arab States on the Mediterranean (as soon as physics is
developed there to the extent or having an interest in participating in the Society) should be invited as well.” Bernardini, G. to Danysz [Letter] (1968, Mar.
14), Folder correspondence C-D, AGB/EPS.
96“Working Group A: Draft Constitution, Meeting of the Steering Committee” [Report] (1968, May 3), p. 3, Nr.105/1–2, NWG. Later, one member of the
steering committee stated: “There was quite a lot of heated argument whether any of the countries should be somehow separately dealt with or not …
Israel was one of the countries involved. I think it was the great success of the Prague meeting that we got down to a common denominator and we
thought it would be best if all these countries should join.” Tape 1—EPS September 12th 1968—Geneva [Transcript] (1968, Sept. 12), p. 20, Folder
European Physical Society 1968, AGB/EPS. Hereafter, the document will be referred to as “Tape 1” (1968).
97For example, “[I]f the Soviet Union is excluded, several of the eastern European countries may hesitate to join a European Physical Society.” Thonemann,
P. C. to Bernardini [Letter] (1967, Feb. 1), Nr. 105/2–2, NWG.
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enormous problem for the envisaged structure of the society. On the one hand, by the time the Prague meeting had
taken place, it had been recognized that corporate membership was essential for the participation of Eastern Euro-
peans. On the other hand, it was a fundamental principle that the EPS should not be intergovernmental. This princi-
ple implied that government-based corporate bodies—such as the national academies of science in socialist
countries—were not to be accepted, so that the activities of the EPS would maintain political independence as far as
possible.98 Only formally independent scientific entities, outside or within national academies, could be admitted as
members of the EPS. Therefore, national academies had to form independent specialized groups to join the society.
The strategy of the EPS bureau was to involve the Soviet Academy of Sciences by emphasizing this point, but with-
out mentioning any political motivation.99
Independently of this issue, the participation of the Soviet Union posed other political problems that were dis-
cussed among physicists and scientific institutions within the Soviet Bloc. While most Eastern European national
physical societies (or comparable bodies) were in favor of joining the EPS, the Soviet Academy of Sciences was
against it. The Soviets had never replied to Bernardini's early invitation to enter the discussions. The first meeting
they attended was the one in Prague, to which Kocetkov and Leshkovtsev were sent as Soviet Academy delegates,
plausibly with the main goal of influencing the draft constitution.100 After the Prague meeting, the Soviets confirmed
their negative attitude and remained undecided about whether to join the society. The presidium of the Soviet Acad-
emy of Sciences, under pressure from physicists of other Eastern Bloc countries, discussed the matter again at the
10th International Conference on Physics of Semiconductors, during which Tauc seems to have played a major
role.101 After these negotiations, the Soviet Academy of Sciences resolved to join the society for purely political rea-
sons. While the academy deemed the EPS unnecessary, or even detrimental, the Soviets did not want to show dis-
unity within the Soviet Bloc with respect to this matter.102
After this major decision, there was widespread optimism that the society would be established on September
26, 1968, with institutional representation from national physics groups from all, or at least most, of Europe. The
invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968, however, completely disrupted this optimism little more than
1 month before the official inauguration of the EPS. This event deeply disturbed those physicists who considered
the society as a step toward the cultural and political unity of Europe and viewed the liberal reforms in some socialist
countries as a positive condition for fulfilling this plan. Janouch sent Bernardini a letter a few days after the invasion,
calling for a scientific boycott of Soviet conferences and of Soviet delegations at conferences abroad. Janouch asked
his Western European colleagues to “let [Soviet scientists] share in the shame and feel their responsibility for their
country and government.”103
98The Secretary of the French Physical Society, Francis Netter, said: “We have stressed the point that we wish essentially to have here a body of free
physicists meeting together for discussing matters of common interest and expressing views freely without any reference to any governmental policy. We
cannot do so and agree simultaneously on having our budget mainly constituted by money given by governments.” “Report on the General Session,
Meeting of the Steering Committee” [Transcript] (1968, May 3), Folder 79.5, Series 7, AOD. This principle was generally accepted by the steering
committee, but the question of how to implement this rule remained ambiguous, because the influence of national governments in official scientific groups
varied greatly from country to country.
99“Academies cannot be accepted …. Concerning, e.g., the USSR Academy, write that Professor X,Y have already been invited to join the S.C., but that they
did not answer until today. We can only invite individual (members of the academies), because the Academy has no right to vote. Explanation: (not to give
political reason), but say that a[n] Academy consists of many various branches and not only of Physics Group[s]. If then, they want to form a National
Society, the better.” “Meeting of the Bureau of the Steering Committee, Geneva” [Transcript] (1968, Jun. 11), p. 3, Folder European Physical Society 1968,
AGB/EPS.
100This might be hypothesized from the fact that both Soviet scholars voluntarily joined the working group on the draft constitution. “Report Working
Group A: Draft Constitution at the Meeting of the Steering Committee, Prague” (1968, May 3–4), Folder Prague Meeting May 3–4, 1968, AGB/EPS.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to properly identify these individuals, as first names' initials are not used in the documents and the surnames might have been
misspelled. Leshkovtsev was probably Vladimir A. Leshkovtsev, Secretary of the National Committee of Soviet Physcisists; Kocetkov was perhaps nuclear
physicist Lev A. Kochetkov.
101Štrbáňová & Kostlán (2011, p. 528); Cardona et al. (2011).
102Janouch (1993). This reconstruction is based on the later recollections of the Czechoslovak physicist František Janouch. For reasons that will become
clear in the following paragraphs, he might not be considered a neutral witness, but his later recollections are completely confirmed by some immediate
descriptions of the events in “Tape 1” (1968). See also Tauc, J. to Alfred Kastler [Letter] (1968, Aug. 7); Tauc, J. to S. F. Edwards [Letter] (1968, Aug. 7);
Bernardini, G. to Tauc [Letter] (1968, Aug. 20), Folder correspondence S-T, AGB/EPS.
103Janouch, F. to Bernardini [Letter] (1968, Aug. 24), Folder correspondence I-J, AGB/EPS.
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7 | PHYSICS AS A DIPLOMATIC TOOL: THE FOUNDATION OF THE EPS
AS A RESPONSE TO THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
While politics had been part of the discussions about the foundation of the society from the very first stages of this
initiative, the attempt to expand participation in the society eastwards required the tranformation of verbal concerns
in diplomatic plans of action. Until August 1968, balanced diplomatic moves had been successful in increasing the
participation of Soviet Bloc countries, while also allowing Israeli participation. The invasion of Czechoslovakia
resulted in a severe crisis in which overly political positioning became a central matter of debate.
On September 5, the board members were supposed to meet in Geneva to discuss the last details of the
society's inauguration, but the discussion shifted to the new political situation and whether the society should be
founded at all under these circumstances. The members of the board decided to establish the society as planned, but
to send a letter to national societies and groups from the five countries involved in the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
asking them not to join the society for the time being. The letter was deeply political and contained a firm condem-
nation of the actions undertaken by the Soviet Bloc countries involved in the Czechoslovak crisis:
You will no doubt understand that in view of the recent events your participation at our constituting
assembly had become impossible. Our society stands on the principles of respect for the freedom of
individuals and the sovereignty of nations, large or small. These principles have been and are contin-
ued to be violated by the powers who rule your country, thereby excluding yourselves from the Com-
munity of nations who adhere to these principles. We must therefore request you to abstain assisting
at our meeting until normal conditions are reestablished.104
If sent, this letter would have certainly led to a purely Western–Central European society. But it was never dis-
patched. After having discussed the matter carefully over the phone with Tauc, the board members decided that it
was necessary to call for an urgent meeting of the steering committee at large before compromising a core element
of the initiative with such a letter.105
At the meeting held in Geneva on September 12, it became a matter of harsh controversy whether the steering
committee should refrain from any political action or whether it had a moral obligation to take into consideration the
changed political conditions since the meeting in Prague 4 months earlier. At stake was, in fact, what should actually
be considered as “political” in this sort of international scientific organization. Some forcefully argued that even doing
nothing and maintaining previous plans would become a political action with strong moral and political implications.
That was Peyrou's position, who argued that there was a strong contradiction in the attempt to avoid any political
action: “a European Physical Society is among the many, many tools to avoid the bloc politics, it is political in the
essence of being political.”106
The postponement of the society's foundation to a later date, after the “normalization” of the situation in Czech-
oslovakia, was soon discarded. There was no guarantee that the situation would improve in the future, and, even
more importantly, the physicists recognized that there was no standard definition of “normality” in politics within
Europe, as shown by the status of Germany. The subtler argument was that, in order to found the society, they
would have to accept the situation as normal sooner or later, even in cases where normality was imposed by political
forces external to the people in those countries. The committee could not consider itself capable of defining what
acceptable, normal conditions would have been in a world strongly conditioned by the rivalry of the Cold War super-
powers. This assessment of the situation led to Bernardini's proposal to define normality uniquely with respect to
EPS activities: “we should consider the situation as normal as long as all national societies and all individual physicists
104Letters to East Germans (n.d. [plausibly written 1968, Sept. 5]), unsent, Nr. 105/1–1, NWG. Similar messages were planned to be sent to the physical
societies and academies of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR. “Tape 1” (1968, p. 2).
105Bernardini, G. to Gentner [Telegram] (1968, Sept. 9), Nr. 105/1–1, NWG; “Tape 1” (1968).
106“Tape 1” (1968, p. 13).
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of Europe and neighbouring countries will be really free to join the society with the intention of participating effec-
tively to all its activities.”107 In other words, Bernardini proposed that the society would be established as planned,
with all the individual and institutional members who could freely join.
The most vocal opponent of the business-as-usual approach was Israeli physicist de-Shalit, who criticized the
principle that international scientific societies should avoid overt political demonstrations. Comparing the present sit-
uation of the steering committee to the attitude of apolitical scientists during the Nazi period, he questioned the
proposition that an international scientific society could really be apolitical when facing serious political situations.
He then advanced as a temporary solution the foundation of a society formed only by individuals, excluding all
national societies entirely. His rationale was that national scientific bodies might be more prone to exercising political
pressures at their governments' behest. He made the example of a national society's veto of the entrance into the
EPS of possible refugees from its own country, which would force the EPS to face political controversies and effec-
tively negate the principle of freedom of participation in the societies' activities.108
In the discussion that followed, the majority of Western European physicists became more and more explicit in
their views that liberal democratic values were central tenets in the future society, with liberal democratic values
understood here as anti-totalitarian tenets based on the principle of individual freedom—very similar to the views
promoted by de Rougemont. Liberal democratic principles were, in fact, embedded in the principle that the EPS was
based on free membership and on the related decision to refuse membership to governmental institutions. After the
Czechoslovak crisis, this implicit connection was reinforced by reconfiguring the society as a potential diplomatic tool
to support Eastern European dissident scientists and to thereby spread values that were intrinsically anti-totalitarian
and based on the principle of individual freedom. Bernardini stated this quite explicitly: doing nothing was not
acceptable because the society had to stand by colleagues in socialist countries who had become political dissidents
by overly opposing the invasion of Czechoslovakia, colleagues such as Andrej Sakharov.109
This interpretation of the purpose of the society was emphasized by Janouch, who had asked for a boycott less
than 20 days earlier. He recognized that his early reaction had been dictated by emotion. A more reasoned judgment
on the role of international scientific activities was now necessary in order to fashion the society into a diplomatic
tool. Janouch argued that founding the society as planned in September 1968, without the exclusion of any Warsaw
Pact countries, was the best way of supporting Czechoslovak physicists in this moment of crisis. The situation was
such that Czechoslovak physicists would still be able to join. This might have become impossible in the future, or if
other countries of the Soviet Bloc were excluded. “I think one should create the society now,” he concluded. Once
the society had been formed, it could then become a political actor and find diplomatic ways to act in support of
Czechoslovak physicists in the international arena.110
The majority of attendees accepted the suggestion to avoid political demonstrations in the present situation,
and to defer political actions supportive of dissidents until after the foundation of the society. In doing so, they
described physics as a strategic tool to overcome East–West political divides, and to thereby “help mankind,” as
emphasized by Swedish physicist and permanent secretary of the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences, Erik
Rudberg.111 The watchword became “try to unify all the countries on the basis of physics,” which represented the
fulfillment through diplomatic actions of the cultural unity argument, as emphasized in the public presentations of
107“Tape 1” (1968, p. 3).
108“Tape 1” (1968, pp. 8–9).
109See various statements in “Tape 1” (1968): for example, “[I]t should be stated clearly that it is a free Society and everyone, where the Society is going to
be built, should behave like a free man,” (p. 6; unknown, probably de-Shalit); Bernardini stated, “if we do nothing … this would be more or less against the
people, the friends in all countries, but particularly in the Socialist countries who, after all, share our opinions [e.g.] in respect to the academician Zacharov
[sic]” (pp. 11–12); Janouch stated, “we need to be supported from abroad … it is a moral obligation of all intellectuals and all scientists” (p. 14); “if we do not
establish the Physical Society then there won't be the possibilities to contact those countries as it would be if the Physical society [were] formed, and
through these contacts we can always manage to get our points across” (pp. 21–22; unknown). Albeit in a completely different context, the diplomatic
function of the value of scientific freedom closely resembles the argument that scientific freedom and internationalism were elements of U.S. cultural
propaganda in the psychological Cold War, without necessarily requiring an alignment with the U.S. conceptions of liberal values, as emphasized by Audra
Wolfe (2018).
110“Tape 1” (1968, p 15).
111“Tape 1” (1968, p 17).
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the EPS.112 Whatever position they expressed during the discussion, everyone agreed that, in this more strategic
sense, founding the society was itself a political act. Even though some protested, the final decision was to found
the society as planned, with only a weak mention of the ongoing political situation in the letter of invitation to scien-
tific institutions.
This decision enabled the EPS to be established on September 26, 1968, with sizeable participation from Eastern
European physicists (Figure 4). Lev Artsimovich attended the meeting and signed the constitution as the representa-
tive of the department of physics and astronomy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Next to him, Janouch and
three other physicists from Prague signed the constitution, one of whom was Z. Plajner as the official representative
of the Union of Czechoslovak mathematicians and physicists (Jednota cˇeskoslovenských matematiku˚ a fyziku˚).113
8 | THE JANOUCH AFFAIR: EPS SUPPORT OF A DISSIDENT PHYSICIST
The idea, envisaged at the dramatic meeting that took place between the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the founda-
tion of the EPS, that the society, once established, might become active in supporting Eastern European scientists in
their struggles against domestic political discrimination was actually realized in the first years of the society. Janouch
was elected as a member of the Executive Committee of the Council of the EPS and served as vice-secretary,
responsible for the Eastern European branch of the secretariat in Prague. At that time, the situation in Czechoslova-
kia had deteriorated for those physicists who were overtly critical of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the new
F IGURE 4 National membership of the EPS, as represented by the official national bodies that signed the
constitution on September 26, 1968. This map has been realized using historicalmapchart.net (https://
historicalmapchart.net/world-cold-war.html), retrieved June 20, 2018 (CC BY-SA 4.0). National borders in historical
periods were, of course, a matter of political controversy and diplomatic negotiations. This is certainly the case for
the identification of the Sinai region as part of the Israeli state after the Six-Day War. The author does not intend to
make, or share, any claim concerning the geopolitical description conveyed by the tool employed. This is simply a
representation of the membership of the EPS in 1968
112“Tape 1” (1968, p. 20). Unfortunately, it is not clear who was talking here.
113“Foundation of the Society” (1968). The national representation of the 62 scientists attending the meeting at which the society was founded was
distributed as follows: Switzerland (9), UK (9), West Germany (8), France (7), Italy (7), Czechoslovakia (4), The Netherlands (3), Austria (2) Israel (2), Hungary
(2), Belgium (1), Finland (1), Ireland (1), Morocco (1), Rumania (1), Spain (1), Sweden (1), USSR (1), USA (1). The Physical Section of the Yugoslav Association
for Mathematicians, Physicists, and Astronomers was included in the list of the official bodies signing the constitution, with L. Slaus as the representative.
Although he was not physically present, this was agreed in a phone call. “European Physical Society, Report Plenary Session at CERN” (1968, Sept. 26), p. 7,
Folder European Physical Society 1968, AGB/EPS. All the participants were male, apart from the scientific secretary Lorette Etienne-Amberg. The issue of
gender representation was never a matter of discussion in the foundation of the EPS.
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regime that arose. Janouch was politically persecuted after signing a resolution seeking change in the new leading
organs of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, which were perceived as being too close to the Soviet occupiers,
and requesting the abolition of censorship in scientific publications. In October 1969, Janouch was prevented from
participating in the activities of the EPS outside Czechoslovakia. One year later, he lost his position at the Institute
for Nuclear Research of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences under a new law named the Labor Code
(implemented in 1970), according to which anyone could be dismissed should they “violate the socialist social
order.”114 In addition, he was no longer allowed to give lectures at Charles University in Prague and isolated from his
peers.115
News of the discrimination faced by Janouch and other Czechoslovak physicists soon became a matter of con-
cern for Western European physicists.116 The EPS immediately became part of a support network tasked with
pressuring Eastern European institutions to improve Janouch's situation.117 West German physicist Hans A. Kastrup
urged EPS officials to send a letter to the presidium of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences asking them to give
Janouch another job or to allow him to accept an offer at a research institution abroad. According to Kastrup, this
letter would have to be formulated fairly generally in order to emphasize the fact that it was not merely in support of
a single scientist but could prevent, with an action “from the West,” other dismissals due to political discrimina-
tion.118 Part of the proposed strategy should also include an offer to Janouch for some regular work abroad. By
August 1970, the presidency of the EPS had been taken over by Erik Rudberg. He undertook a series of actions to
protest against the treatment of Janouch in his home country, with letters to the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences
and through diplomatic channels at the ambassadorial level. The issue was whether the EPS should be formally
involved in any political action against Janouch's dismissal. Rudberg believed that, formally, the EPS should not fol-
low Kastrup's proposal. The rationale was that if any actions were to be officially discussed by the EPS Executive
Committee, it would have put the Eastern European members in a difficult situation, especially those who opposed
their domestic regimes. They would be obliged to vote against the proposal, whatever their individual positions on
the matter. Nevertheless, the EPS could serve as a support network without taking any formal action, especially by
providing possibilities for meetings between Eastern and Western European physicists.119 Urged on by Weisskopf,
Rudberg began to search for a suitable position for Janouch in Sweden to propose to the Czechoslovak Academy of
Sciences. This quickly led to an invitation from the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences to spend some years in Swe-
den as guest professor of the academy.120 Janouch, however, was not allowed to leave the country and accept this
position.121
After this strategy failed, the EPS became more vocal in its attempts to improve Janouch's situation in the fol-
lowing years. In 1973, the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences proposed hosting the next general congress of the
EPS, to be held in 1975, in Prague. In his official reply, the new president of the EPS, industrial physicist Hendrik B.
G. Casimir, stressed that Janouch had remained unemployed for almost 4 years, asking the president of the Academy
for clarification.122 In response to EPS support for Janouch, the Czechoslovak delegation at the EPS tried to organize
a boycott by the Eastern European physicists.123 They withdrew their proposal to hold the 1975 general conference
in Prague and asked all Eastern European delegates to leave the EPS. This planned boycott failed because of the neg-
ative reaction from other Eastern European physicists. The Rumanian delegation made the best of the situation and
114Janouch (1975). See also Bolton (2014, pp. 47–50).
115Janouch (1993). In spring 1969, in response to the changing political climate, Tauc emigrated to the United States: Cardona et al. (2011).
116Kastrup, H. to Weisskopf [Letter] (1970, Sept. 20), Folder correspondence I-J, AGB/EPS.
117Gentner, W. to Ganzhorn [Letter] (1970, Oct. 2), Nr. 107/2, NWG; Bernardini, G. to Rudberg [Letter] (1970, Sept. 28), Folder correspondence Q-R,
AGB/EPS.
118Kastrup, H. to Weisskopf [Letter] (1970, Sept. 20), Folder correspondence I-J, AGB/EPS.
119Rudberg, E. to Bernardini [Letter] (1970, Oct. 3), Folder correspondence Q-R, AGB/EPS.
120Rudberg, E. to A. Winther [Letter] (1974, Dec. 27), E01:20, Erik Rudberg's archives, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden.
121Bolton (2014, pp. 47–50)
122Janouch (1993).
123Fritz Bopp, a West German physicist and original member of the steering committee, reported that the EPS refused to go to Prague because of the
treatment of its members: Bopp, F. to Adolf Butenandt [Letter] (1973, Jun. 17), Nr. 663, Rep. 84–2: Nachlass Adolf Butenandt, III Abt., Archiv der MPG,
Berlin, Germany.
LALLI 23
successfully launched an alternative proposal to hold the EPS general conference in Bucharest rather than Prague.
Janouch was eventually allowed to leave Czechoslovakia at the end of 1973. According to him, the political pressure
exerted by the EPS played a major role in this turn of events. The EPS network's intervention proved fundamental
for the continuation of Janouch's career, because he was able to accept the position secured in Sweden by the early
involvement of Rudberg.124 As soon as he had settled in Sweden, Janouch founded the Foundation Charter 77 to
provide the principal opposition group Charter 77 and other dissidents in his native Czechoslovakia with financial
support and technical equipment in the later years of communist rule.125
9 | CONCLUSION
Janouch's trajectory powerfully shows that the diplomatic objectives put forward by the EPS during the dramatic dis-
cussions following the invasion of Czechoslovakia were not just empty talk. The EPS actually became a tool for over-
coming political divides, specifically by spreading liberal-democratic values to Eastern European countries through
physics and under the label of cultural unity, especially in support of physicists facing political discrimination.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the society was certainly not born this way. Rather, the specific needs of a
community of CERN-related Western European physicists connected with utopian and elitist views about the cul-
tural and political unity of Europe. This process started around the mid-1960s, and my account of it takes up the
story where John Krige's American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe left off.126 The con-
struction of the EPS was a strategy envisaged by CERN-based physicists precisely as a response to U.S. hegemony in
physics. According to them, the EPS could become the organizing structure for the emergence of a comparable world
power based on an independent and united European physics community.
This project became feasible due to the changing political and economic circumstances in 1960s Europe. In the
mid-1960s, Bernardini and others believed that European physics could become strong enough to challenge U.S.
dominance. This is particularly striking because Bernardini was one of the actors in Krige's narrative who lobbied
most for U.S. support for Italian physics in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Like Bernardini, the elites of
Western European physics had been involved in what Krige calls the co-production of the U.S. hegemonic role in
European science because the conditions were such that U.S. aid was indeed considered essential during the recon-
struction phase. Between the end of World War II and the mid-1960s, an Americanization of Western European
physics had taken place; for Americanization, I use Krige's definition of it as a process by which U.S. “scientific
accomplishments remained an omnipresent point of reference and a constant source of pressure for change in
Europe, while U.S. recognition of European achievements was an essential source of scientific credibility and scien-
tific capital.”127 However, the U.S. model was never fully accepted by the European elites involved, as Krige points
out. Instead, different worldviews and values remained in the background, and these, in part, took the form of anti-
U.S. sentiments and the desire to build an alternative European model.
These complex relations between Western European and U.S. physics constituted, along with the European
political landscape of the Cold War, an important part of the foundation on which the EPS was built. The American
Physical Society and its journals were both the model used to build the society and the elements against which the
new society was designed to compete at the scientific level. In the process, the social impact of this scientific compe-
tition was publicly emphasized by arguing that, in terms of civilization, Europeans were morally superior to Ameri-




127Krige (2006, p. 269).
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[Europe] is the cradle of the world's greatest civilization, which has been a powerful reality in human
progress for centuries …. Our century is seeing new radical changes in the economical, political and
spiritual structures of human society. New countries are being born which develop technically up to
high standards, but without the roots of a broad culture, which can be the source of great strength
for the country and for the individual. It is Europe that has most to offer in the formation of the struc-
ture of human society in the future where [s]cience could take the role of a new humanism. The Euro-
pean Physical Society is founded in these hopes.”128
Bernardini was clearly referring to the US, and possibly also the USSR, as the competing countries in what he
called “the race for primacy in the civilized world,” whereas a united Europe, in view of its historical roots in the
Renaissance, might offer a much more valuable perspective for peaceful human progress than the two rival Cold
War superpowers.
Since one of Bernardini's strongest motivations was to improve editorial practices in Italy through a process of
internationalization, one might conclude that Bernardini and others came to see Europe as an independent interna-
tional framework that could replace the US as the hegemonic scientific powerhouse for directing national programs.
Initially, this view was strongly connected to visions of European cultural unity, along the lines of de Rougemont's
efforts for a federalist Europe. Whether the physicists involved recognized it or not, this vision, as promoted by de
Rougemont, was actually related to strongly anti-totalitarian and anti-communist perspectives. This ideological link-
age between liberal democratic values and European cultural unity remained, albeit in a non-explicit way, a constitu-
tive element of the EPS's future structure. Along the way, the theme of cultural unification was emphasized at the
level of public discourse, but disappeared from the physicists' actual intellectual exchange. The negotiations were, in
fact, conditioned by the political situation in Europe, the interests of national physical societies, and the desire to
secure independence from national governments. The outcome of these negotiations gave the society a structure
and function that differed significantly from the one initially envisaged by Bernardini, Gentner, and others. This is
particularly true of its scope, which was explicitly limited from taking any role in the supra-national organization of
research, evidently one of the major initial goals of CERN-related physicists.
While absent in the actual negotiations, the idea of a culturally unified Europe was influential in fortifying the
will for a geographically inclusive physical society as a response to the divisive Cold War political context. The deci-
sion to involve national institutions and, at the same time, to build a truly pan-European society led to the
reformulation of this initiative as a diplomatic one, with all the political maneuvering and negotiations that implied.
However, the major transformation in Western European physicists' perception of the society occurred only after
the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This dramatic event forced the actors to rephrase in more specific
ways the principles, values, and moral identity of the future endeavor, which, in the words of the protagonists,
became a society that could help to spread the value of individual freedom as well as support dissident scientists in
Eastern European countries. And this is exactly what happened in the case of the Janouch affair.
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